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Date: June 2, 2000
To: Interested Parties
From: Art Siegel, Executive Director
Attached for your information and review is a copy of ISB ED 00- 
1, the purpose of which is to defer the original June 15, 2000 
effective date of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain Independence 
Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities, until 
60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove 
conflicts with the Standard.
The Board would appreciate your responding to the one question on 
the last page of the ED—“Is it appropriate to defer the proposed 
effective date of ISB Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing 
rules of the SEC are modified to remove conflicts with the 
Standard?” Please note that comments must be received by July 5, 
2000.
Additional copies of the ED for your associates are available 
directly from the ISB, or from our website, 
www.cpaindependence.org.
Thank you for your interest in auditor independence issues and the 
ISB.
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 

















































































































































Q1. Is it appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB Standard No. 2 
until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove Conflicts 
with the Standard?
"philip lochner jr" To: < Asiegel@cpaindependence.org>
<plochner@worldnet. cc:
att.net > Subject: ISB Standard No. 2
06/10/00 10:26 AM
Dear Art,
This is in response to your June 2memo. I believe it is appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB 
Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove conflicts with the Standard. 
Phil Lochner

























































































































































































































































































































o dated June 2000
06/19/00 08:33 AM
Regarding your question, 
"Is it appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB Standard No. 
2 until
60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove conflicts with the Standard?"
My response is 
"YES".
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association 
College Retirement Equities Fund  
730 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017-3206    
212 490-9000 1 800 842-2733
Richard L. Gibbs





Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: ED 00-1
Dear Sirs:
We believe it is reasonable and entirely appropriate to defer the proposed effective 
date of ISB Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to 
remove conflicts with the Standard.
Sincerely,
Richard L. Gibbs 
Executive Vice President
RLG/mc
Katch, Tyson & Company
JUN 1 9 2000
191 WAUKEGAN ROAD
NORTHFIELD, ILLINOIS 60093-2726 
(847) 446-3700
FAX NO. (847) 446-7514
June 15, 2000
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: ED 00-1
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to Exposure Draft 00-1, 
Deferral of Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2. The exposure 
draft defers the original June 15, 2000 effective date until sixty 
days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to comply with 
the Standard.
My objection is not with the deferral, but with the idea that the 
deferral has no sunset. It is dependent upon the SEC making the 
necessary modifications. What if the SEC, for whatever reason, 
does not make the modifications until 2003. Are we prepared to 
wait until 2003? I hope not. I believe the deferral should have 
an "the earlier of modification by the SEC or a date (December 31, 
2000).
Sincerely,




280 Park Avenue 
New York, NY 10017
Telephone 212 909 5400
Fax 212 909 5699
JUN 2 6 2000June 26,2000
Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Sirs:
Invitation to Comment [ED 00-1] 
Deferral of Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain Independence 
Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Exposure Draft [ED 00-1]: Deferral of 
Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain Independence Implications of Audits of 
Mutual Funds and Related Entities. We agree with the proposal to defer the effective 
date of ISB Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to 
remove conflicts with the Standard. In addition, we would also recommend a working 
group be established to develop implementation guidance for ISB Standard No. 2.










































1270 Avenue of the Americas
Suite 2500





1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York NY 10036-8775
Re: Exposure Draft: Deferral of Effective Date of ISB Standard #2
Gentlemen:
This letter is in response to your request for specific input on whether it is appropriate to 
defer the proposed effective date of ISB Standard #2 (the "Exposure Draft") until 60 days after 
existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove conflicts with the Standard. The views expressed 
in this letter are those of the undersigned and are not to be attributed to the law firm of which the 
undersigned is a partner.
The SEC, under its governing statute, has responsibility and authority to prescribe financial 
reporting and disclosure standards with respect to filings by those entities required to file periodic 
reports with the SEC. The SEC also has responsibility and authority for regulating the conduct of 
accountants who practice before the SEC. As part of the foregoing, the SEC has authority to 
prescribe independence standards with respect to accountants performing audits and rendering 
opinions on financial statements filed with the SEC. The SEC has exercised its powers described 
above, to promulgate certain rules which are in conflict with the Exposure Draft.
The SEC has chosen to defer to the ISB in the area of setting independence standards but 
nonetheless retains the ultimate responsibility and authority in that area and monitors the activities 
of the ISB. Under these circumstances it is not appropriate for the ISB to issue a Standard which 
conflicts with an existing SEC Standard until such time as the SEC repeals its conflicting Standard.
I thank you for this opportunity to comment on the Exposure Draft and would be pleased to 
discuss the subject matter of this letter with any members of the ISB or its staff.
AMS.cac



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor




The AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) is pleased to submit this 
comment letter to the Independence Standards Board with regard to ED 00-1, Deferral of 
Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain Independence Implications of Audits of 
Mutual Funds and Related Entities.
We support the Board’s proposed standard which would defer the effective date of ISB 
Standard No. 2 until 60 days after the SEC rules are revised. Specifically, we believe that 
to require compliance with this standard prior to conforming changes to the SEC rules, 
would only add to the complexity of the existing independence rules. We also believe 
that the proposed 60 days is an appropriate time frame for requiring compliance.
We also recommend that the Board establish a working group to consider the need for 
implementation guidance or an interpretation to deal with such issues, and the need to 
conform ISB No. 2 more closely to the approach taken in the Financial Interests and 
Family Relationships project.
We appreciate this opportunity to comment. We would be pleased to discuss in further 





American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, NJ 07311-3881 • (201) 938-3000 • (212) 318-0500 • fax (201) 938-3329 • www.aicpa.org 
ISO 9001 Certified
The CPA. Never Underestimate The Value.®
Arthur Andersen
Arthur Andersen LLP
225 North Michigan Avenue 
Chicago IL 60601-7600
Tel 312 782 0225
Fax 312 507 2548
June 30, 2000
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: ED 00-1
Gentlemen:
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to your request for comments on Exposure Draft (ED 00-1), 
Deferral of Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual 
Funds and Related Entities.
We support the Board’s proposal to defer the effective date of ISB Standard No. 2 until 60 days after the 
SEC’s existing rules are modified. We agree that it is appropriate to postpone implementation of the 
standard until it and the SEC’s rules are aligned.
In addition, we recommend that the Board consider development of guidance to aid in implementation 
and interpretation of the standard. Stated briefly below are a few issues we feel such guidance might 
clarify.
1. Would the standard allow for any materiality considerations in determining which entities in the 
complex must be restricted?
2. Additional guidance on the standard’s application to sub-advisers would be helpful.
3. While the intent of the standard seems to be the restriction of the financial interests of firms and 
individuals, it is not clear how it should be applied to services provided to, or loans from, entities 
within the complex that are not attest clients.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on ED 00-1. We would be happy to discuss the above should 









Q1. Is it appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB Standard No.2 
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Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
PLEASE REPLY TO:
Proskauer Rose LLP 
Suite 800 
1233 - 20th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(VOICE) (202) 416-6820 
(FAX) (202)416-6899
Re: Exposure Draft (ED 00-1) Deferral of Effective Date of ISB
Standard No. 2
Gentlemen:
We are writing on behalf of the Committee on Law and Accounting (the 
“Committee”) of the Section of Business Law (the “Section”) of the American 
Bar Association (the “ABA”) in response to your request ED 00-1 for comments 
on whether it is appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB Standard 
No. 2, Certain Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related 
Entities (“ISB 2”), until 60 days after certain existing rules of the Securities 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are modified to remove conflicts with that 
Standard. Although this letter lias been circulated among members of the 
Committee and a majority of those who have responded have expressed their 
general concurrence with the views we express in this letter, this letter does not 
necessarily represent the views of all of the members of our Committee, the 
Section or the ABA.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the issue raised in ED 00-1.
The SEC, under provisions of various statutes that it is charged with 
administering, has the authority to require registration statements and reports 
required to be filed with it pursuant to those statutes to include financial 
statements audited by independent certified public accountants. The SEC has 
adopted rules relating to the circumstances in which it will not recognize a 
certified public account as independent and codified various of its interpretations 




The ISB believes that certain of those rules and interpretations may 
conflict with the provisions of ISB 2.
The SEC has permitted the ISB to set independence standards, but, 
nonetheless, has retained the ultimate responsibility and authority in that area and 
monitors the activities of the ISB.
Under these circumstances, we do not believe that it would be appropriate 
for the SEC to continue in enforce rules that conflict with ISB 2 or any other ISB 
standards that the SEC, in exercising its oversight over the ISB, has permitted to 
take effect. We understand that, on June 27, 2000, the SEC authorized the 
issuance of proposals for comment that would address this issue.
Accordingly, we believe it would be entirely appropriate and most 
desirable for the ISB to defer the proposed effective date of ISB 2 until that 
rulemaking is complete. We believe that were the Independence Standards Board 
to do otherwise, independent auditors and their audit clients would be subject to 
confusion as to what conduct affected the auditors independence. Were the SEC 
to find judgments in this regard to be wrong, auditors might be unable to provide 
audit services to clients and could be subject to SEC disciplinary proceedings. 
Their clients could be subject to the consequences of not having their financial 
statements in compliance with SEC requirements, including disruptions of 
offerings of securities and other transactions. These would be unacceptable 
results.
We reiterate our appreciation for the opportunity you have extended to our 
Committee to comment on this important topic.
Richard H. Rowe, Chair 
Committee on Law and 
Accounting, Section of Business 
















1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: ED 00-1, Deferral of Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain 
Independence Implication of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities
Dear Sirs:
We believe that it is appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB 
Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing SEC rules are modified to remove 
conflicts with the Standard.
* * * * *
If you have any questions concerning our comments, please contact








Sent: Wednesday, July 05, 2000 3:21 PM 
To: ’isb@cpaindependence.org'
 Subject: Response to ED 00-1
Based on our review of ED 00-1, we feel that it is appropriate to defer the proposed 
effective date of ISB Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are 
modified to remove conflicts with the Standard.
Michael J. Gomez
Deputy Auditor General
State of Florida Auditor General 









1177 Avenue of the Americas 
New York NY 10036 
Telephone (212) 596 7000 





Return fax number: (212) 596-8990
Date: 7 / 7
No. of pages
(incl. this page) If this fax is incomplete or illegible please telephone
This facsimile transmission is intended for the addressee indicated above. It may contain information that it privileged, confidential, or 
otherwise protected from disclosure. Any review, dissemination or use of this transmission or its contents by persons other than the 
addressee is strictly prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately by telephone, and mail the 




Mr. Arthur Siegel, Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Mr. Siegel:
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) is pleased to submit comments1 on the Independence 
Standards Board’s (ISB or Board) Exposure Draft (ED) 00-1, Deferral of Effective Data 
of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and 
Related Entities.
1 The comments in this letter have been developed from the perspective of our firm as an ISB constituent. As y»»u 
know, PwC's chief executive officer, James J. Schiro, is a member of the ISB. In carrying out his responsibilities as a 
board member, Mr. Schiro intends to fully exercise objectivity with a view to helping the ISB to reach conclusions on 
this project that are in the best interests of independence standard-setting and the investing public. The comments in 
this letter have been developed consistent with that goal but should not be viewed as necessarily indicative of Mr 
Schiro’s personal views and do not serve to bind him in any particular thought process in his role as an ISB member.
Below is our response to die question contained in the ED.
Question 1: Is it appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB Standard No. 2 
until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove conflicts with the 
Standard?
We believe that deferral is appropriate. Piecemeal adoption of the standard would only 
serve to increase the complexities and confusion associated with it, some of which we 
describe below. More importantly, in light of the SEC’s recent proposed amendments to 
the independence rules, we think ISB 2 should be deferred until it is clear how the 
amendments will affect this area. In our view, it is important that the ISB be in synch 
with the SEC in this area, particularly to avoid multiple rule changes in a short period of 
time.
Once the ISB has a clear indication of where the SEC is headed in its rulemaking and 
how that rulemaking will impact the matters covered by ISB 2, we suggest that the Board 
Mr. Arthur Siegel
July 6, 2000
Page 2 of 9
consider the following matters before allowing ISB 2 to become effective. These matters 
involve implementation difficulties that we have identified to date, including 1SB staff 
positions that we believe go beyond the restrictions intended by the Board.
The re-examination and subsequent amendment by a standard setter of a recently issued 
standard occurs from time to time when the need to do so is perceived to be significant 
For example, the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has re-examined 
certain of its standards to appropriately deal with implementation issues. Last month the 
FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 138, Accounting 
for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedging Activities, an amendment of 
FASB Statement No. 133, to address certain implementation difficulties in applying SFAS 
No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, which was 
issued in June 1998 and had an effective date of June 15, 1999. Further, the FASB staff 
has issued a number of guidebooks lu provide implementation guidance un various 
accounting standards. These measures reflect the fact that the FASB cannot anticipate 
and address all of the implementation questions that might arise fur a particular standard 
when it is issued. Because the ISB cannot either, we think it is appropriate for the Board 
to re-examine ISB 2 now for the matters described in this letter. Moreover, based on 
comments made by the SEC’s chief accountant during the Board's May 1, 2000 meeting 
(i.e., that he has received requests from several of the accounting firms for the SEC staff 
to address issues arising from ISB 2), it appears that other firms may also have 
implementation issues. We suggest the Board identify and address those issues as well to 
ensure that its first standard imposing independence restrictions on auditors appropriately 
matches restrictions with threats and properly reflects the Board’s intent.
The comments that follow pertain to the following areas:
• Application of materiality
• Requirement tn be independent vs. a restriction on investing
• Definition of a mutual fund complex
• Those in a position to influence the audit
• Definition of a mutual fund
Application of Materiality
We agree with the provision in footnote. 2 of the standard that provides for the use of 
materiality in determining whether an auditor of a mutual fund should adhere to 
investment restrictions with respect to the non-client parent of the fund's outside 
investment adviser (i.e., an adviser that is not part of the mutual fluid complex) and to the 
non-client subsidiaries of the non-client parent. The use of materiality in such cases 
appropriately matches any investment restriction to the corresponding level of 
independence threat. We have been advised by the ISB staff that materiality cannot be 
Mr. Arthur Siegel
July 6, 2000
Page 3 of 9
used, however, in determining whether investment restrictions should apply to non-client 
entities (parents and their subsidiaries) that are within the mutual fund complex. We arc 
puzzled by this.
First, the wording in footnote 2 can easily be interpreted as allowing the application of 
materiality in cases involving non-dient parents of advisers within the fund complex. In 
fact, that is how we interpret the footnote.
Second, in our view there is no conceptual basis to support prohibiting the use of 
materiality merely because the non-client entities are inside the fund complex rather than 
outside. The independence threats that arise from a mutual fund/parem company 
relationship are not dependent upon whether the related investment advisor is inside or 
outside the fond complex; rather, the threats depend on whether the relationship between 
the mutual fund and the parent is material. If the Board believes there is a basis to 
support the prohibition of materiality in these situations, it should state the rationale for it. 
in the Basis for Conclusions, especially since this matter was raised during the comment 
process.
Further, prohibiting the use of materiality in such situations would result in the 
application of restrictions that go well beyond the potential independence threats. Even if 
an auditor audits only one mutual fond and even if that fund is de minimis to the 
investment adviser and its upstream parent entities, the auditor would be prohibited from 
investing in any of the non-client parents and any of their subsidiaries. We do not see 
how such a broad restriction benefits the auditor's independence of the mutual fond. For 
example, say a non-client bank has a subsidiary font wholly owns another subsidiary that 
itself wholly owns an entity that is foe investment adviser to a group of mutual funds. 
Based on advisory fees paid by the funds, they are immaterial to all of the upstream 
entities. Under ISB 2, as clarified for us by the ISB staff, the auditor of the funds would 
be deemed not independent of those funds if he, his firm, or those in foe firm who are in a 
position to influence the audit had an investment in any of the upstream entities including 
the top-tier non-client bank. But change the facts slightly and make the investment 
advisor an entity that is outside of the fund complex, and such an investment would be 
permissible. This goes against common sense. We see no incentive for the auditor to be 
less than objective during the conduct of the fund audit in either scenario. The result also 
is inconsistent with the general notion of applying materiality in mvestor/investee 
situations, which we see as analogous.
Section 602.02.b.iii of foe SEC’s Codification of Financial Reporting Policies permits the 
use of materiality in determining whether an auditor could invest in a non-client investor 
or investee2. In the discussion m Section 602.02.h.iii, if the non-client investee is
2 We were advised by the SEC staff several years ago that the discussion in Section 602.02.b.iii was not meant to 
exclude situations in which the investor is the non client; i.e., Materiality would apply in both non-client investor/client 
investee and non-client investee/client investor situations.
Mr. Arthur Siegel
July 6, 2000
Page 4 of 9
immaterial to the client investor, members are permitted to invest in the non-client 
investee3. Investors and investees arc often equated with parents and subsidiaries4, as 
well as entities where ownership is less than fifty percent and control may or may not 
exist between the entities. The Board has concluded that "the typical mutual fund/adviser 
relationship is not that of a subsidiary/parent" (paragraph 14 of ISB 2). Among the 
reasons for this conclusion is the fact that there is no majority ownership or voting 
control between the adviser and the mutual fund. Accordingly, such relationships should 
be viewed as analogous to non-controlling (rather than controlling) investor/investee 
situations.
We believe that a materiality test should be applied in evaluating all mutual fund-parent 
company relationships, not just those in which the fund’s investment adviser is outside of 
the mutual fund complex. We encourage the Board to specifically address this issue to 
ensure that 1) the restrictions arc proportional to the related independence threats, and 2) 
the restrictions provide a commensurate benefit to the investing public.
Requirement to be independent vs. a restriction on investing
This project arose in response to questions about whether an auditor of one or more 
mutual funds could invest in non-client sister funds and whether an audit firm could audit 
one or more funds in a fund family while its pension assets were invested in non-client 
hinds in the same fund family. From the beginning of this project, we viewed these to be 
the issues that the Board was addressing. We believe this is what the Board thought it 
was addressing as well, in fact, the second sentence of paragraph 1 of ED 99-1. Certain 
Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities, states, in part:
The primary issues arc whether knowledgeable and reasonable investors believe 
that (a) investments by certain partners of an audit firm in non-client funds within 
a mutual fund complex, or (b) investments through an employee benefit plan by 
the spouses and dependents of such partners in client mutual funds create 
conflicting interests that compromise the credibility of the auditor's reports on the 
financial statements of the entities it audits.
Other areas of ED 99 1 confirm the focus on investments and the Board's 
acknowledgement of this. For example, Question 1 of the ED states:
The Board's proposal proscribes investments in non-audit client sister funds... 
As a result, the proposal will permit investments in such other funds by all other 
partners.
3 The investment would have to be immaterial to their net worth.
4 For example, AICPA Ethics Interpretation 101-8, which also contains materiality tests to determine investment 




Page 5 of 9
The discussions in the Basis for Conclusions of ISB 2 further confirm this understanding. 
All of those discussions center on investment restrictions and the reasons for the Board 
prescribing them in certain cases and not requiring them in others.
Unfortunately, certain parts of ISB 2 characterize the required investment restrictions 
simply as a requirement to be independent The ISB staff has interpreted that 
characterization, which we think was inadvertent, as requiring independence beyond 
investment restrictions. This has broad implications, especially for the audit firms 
themselves. It precludes not only investments in non-client entities, but any other 
relationships with those entities if such relationships would be precluded in connection 
with an audit client. Thus, under the staff’s interpretation, firms would be precluded from 
rendering certain non-audit services (e.g., bookkeeping services) to non-client entities 
within the fund complex, even if the entity is a remote non-client subsidiary of the top- 
level non-client parent. This may also mean that firms would be unable to cuter into a 
business relationship with one of the non-client entities and would have an independence 
issue if a family member of an individual on the audit team held a position of importance 
with one of the non-client entities or a former partner of the firm took a responsible 
position with one of those entities. These conclusions are difficult to justify when non- 
client entities are involved, especially if those entities arc several tiers removed from the 
audit client mutual fund or other non-fund client entity.
We strongly recommend that the Board consider whether the staff's interpretation reflects 
the Board's intentions. If it does, the Board should carefully consider the implications of 
such broad restrictions before ISB 2 becomes effective, especially whether such 
restrictions are proportional to the independence threats. We suggest that the Board first 
analyze whether there would be an independence threat when a firm renders certain non­
audit services to a non-client entity in the complex or utilizes the normal and customary 
products or services (such as lending facilities or brokerage accounts) of one of those 
non-clients. Making such an analysis while mindful of the fact that the entities are not 
audit clients, and in view of the Board's conclusions about the organizational structure of 
a mutual fund complex, we conclude that there would be little, if any, threat to a firm’s 
independence in respect of the audit client within the complex. For example, utilizing 
Appendix A of ISB 2, we believe that the auditor of the mutual fund would not have an 
incentive to be less than objective during the audit just because his firm is providing 
bookkeeping services to the non-client trust company or to the non-client parent holding 
company. Add to this the fact that the audit clients may be immaterial to the upstream 
entities and, per footnote 2, the independence restriction runs even to entities outside the 
fund complex, and we think it is evident that the broad independence requirement goes 
well beyond the threats posed by such relationships.
Mr. Arthur Siegel
July 6, 2000
Page 6 of 9
Please take this opportunity to address this important issue and ensure that the 
requirements of ISB 2 are in proportion to the independence threats that arise from 
various relationships.
Definition of Mutual Fund Complex
ISB 2 defines a mutual fund complex as “the mutual fund operation in its entirety, 
including all the funds, plus the sponsor, its ultimate parent company and their 
subsidiaries.” We have been advised by the ISB staff that despite this definition, any and 
all entities that are underneath the ultimate parent - even if they are not part of the 
operation of the mutual funds - would be considered to be part of the mutual fund 
complex, We question whether this is what the Board intended, especially if the 
requirement is to be independent of such entities rather then simply not invest in them. It 
would mean that a manufacturing subsidiary of a parent that is, for example, well off to 
the left of the entities listed in Appendix A of ISB 2 would need to be considered part of 
the mutual fund complex. So would entities that arc involved in retail operations, high 
technology, entertainment, etc. It is not unusual for many large conglomerates to have 
multiple lines of business such as these, in addition to a stable of mutual funds and other 
financial services products.
We believe the staff's interpretation goes beyond what is necessary to protect the 
independence of the auditor of a mutual fund or other non-fund entity. While it is 
possible that (he Board intended to sweep into the definition of a mutual fund entities that 
are financial services entities, such as those listed in Appendix A and included in the 
definition of "non-fund entity,” it is difficult to understand how relationships with entities 
that have nothing co do with the operation of a mutual fund and are not even financial 
service entities can threaten the independence of the auditor of a mutual fund. We ask 
that the Board consider whether extending investment restrictions (or a broader 
independence requirement) to those outlying entities is truly necessary to protect the 
auditor's independence with respect to audit client mutual funds and related non-fund 
entities.
Those in a Position to Influence the Audit
The definition of “those in a position to influence the audit” is in need of a practical limit 
to who might be included in this category, especially for large firms where hundreds of 
individuals could be swept into this category depending on how one interprets it
The phrase "those who supervise or have direct management responsibility for... the 
partners and staff members involved in the audit" could mean only those individuals 
assigned to the audit engagement in question plus their direct reports who are specific to 
that engagement For example, the partner on the audit of XYZ mutual fund may, in a 
large firm, report to a regional mutual fund industry leader who reports to a regional 
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financial services line of service lender who reports to a national financial services line of 
service leader who reports to the firm's CEO. One interpretation is that all four additional 
partners would be subject to ISB 2 with respect to the non-client sister funds of XYZ. 
However, if the partner on XYZ works in more than one industry, it is unclear whether 
any of the partners in the other industry (to whom this partner reports) would be swept 
into the definition simply because they have direct management responsibility for the 
partner through his other industry involvement Further, if a human resources partner 
participates in the XYZ audit partner's performance evaluation or the setting of his or her 
compensation, it is unclear whether that would be viewed as the type of direct 
management responsibility that would cause the human resources partner to be subject to 
ISB 2. Also uncertain is whether the partners who comprise a firm’s governing board (or 
equivalent group), which could be argued to have management responsibility for the 
entire firm, would be subject to ISB 2.
Non-partner professionals raise similar issues. For example, assume that a manager on 
the XYZ mutual fund audit works on five other audit engagements - none of which are 
subject to ISB 2. Are the partners to whom the manager reports on those engagements 
subject to ISB 2 in connection with the XYZ fund complex simply because they 
supervise and have direct responsibility for that manager - albeit on other engagements? 
If so, would the partners to whom those engagement partners report also be subject to 
ISB 2? We believe the answers to these questions should be no and we suggest that the 
Board clarify this to aid in the consistent application of this provision. The inclusion of 
examples in ISB 2 would also be helpful and we would be happy to work with the ISB 
staff to develop them.
ISB 2 also provides that the person in charge of a firm's consulting department may not 
be “recused” and therefore would always be subject to the standard. We believe that 
even those in charge of a consulting group should be eligible for recusal if certain 
safeguards are in place. We encourage the Board to consider a provision in ISB 2 
acknowledging this based on the following safeguards.
In order to recuse himself or herself, a person in charge of a consulting group must be 
able to appoint an “appropriate designee.’’ An appropriate designee would be an 
individual who (1) has the requisite level of technical expertise, and (2) is capable of 
making an objective and unbiased decision under the circumstances. In addition, we 
recommend that a review be performed of all technical consultations that involved 
designees. Such a review should be performed as part of a firm's annual quality control 
inspection and as part of the firm's triennial peer review. The purpose of the review 
would be to ensure that the designees had the requisite skills and expertise and reached 
conclusions (bat reflected an appropriate level of objectivity.
Similar to the Employment With Audit Clients project, we expect that if a designee 
knows that his or her work will be reviewed by those outside of the audit engagement and 
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by members of another accounting firm, they will be more likely to apply a higher 
standard of care to the work they perform and the decisions they make. In our view, this 
additional review would have even more of a deterrent effect titan that described in 
paragraph 23 of ISB 2. In that paragraph, the Board took comfort from the fact that an 
auditor of certain funds in a fund complex would be less likely to cover up systemic 
problems discovered during an audit because other funds in the complex subject to the 
same system would be audited by another auditor.
1'hus, the last sentence of paragraph 20 of ISB 2 could be revised to read as follows.
On the other hand, professionals in a consulting department may be recused and 
therefore not be subject to the standard’s restrictions if they in fact are not, and 
will not be, involved in any way in (lie audit. When the person who recuses 
himself or herself has direct management responsibility for the consulting 
function, an appropriate designee is required. An appropriate designee is one who 
possesses the requisite level of technical competence in the subject matter, and is 
capable of rendering consulting advice under the circumstances in an objective 
and impartial manner. Situations involving the use of designees should be subject 
to review during the firm’s next annual internal inspection and its next triennial 
peer review. Those reviews shall examine the appropriateness of the designee, 
including his or her qualifications and whether the advice given by the designee 
was appropriate in the circumstances. The principal benefit of this review is its 
deterrent effect Designees are less likely to acquiesce to questionable client 
proposals when they know that their advice will be subject to both internal (firm) 
and external (peer review) scrutiny.
Definition of Mutual Funds
Paragraph 1 of ISB 2 reads as follows:
This Standard applies to the determination of auditor independence with respect 
to audits of mutual funds and related entities which are subject to the 
independence requirements of the SEC.
“Mutual funds” are defined in ISB 2 as investment companies subject to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940. Accordingly, a private fund that is not registered with the SEC 
and thus not subject to the ’40 Act (e.g., an off-shore, non-U.S. fund) would not be a 
mutual fond for purposes of ISB 2. On that basis, paragraph 1 seems to indicate that ISB 
2 does not apply to an auditor of an entity that is related to such a fond. However, the 
ISB staff has staled that ISB 2 would apply despite the wording in paragraph 1. For 
example, a private non-U.S. fond may be advised by a privately held non-U.S. investment 
adviser which is owned by 3 non-U.S. subsidiary of a non-U.S SEC registrant (i.e., one 
based outride the U,S. that files a Form 20-F with the SEC). Further, a non-U.S. auditor 
Mr. Arthur Siegel
July 6, 2000
Page 9 of 9
might audit the registrant, the private fund, and the private adviser. Even though the 
registrant is not related to a fund covered by ISB 2 (because the fund is not a '40 Act 
fund), according to the 1SB staff the non-U.S. auditor would in fact be subject to the 
requirements of ISB 2.
This is not the answer one would get from a literal reading of paragraph 1 and we 
question if this is consistent with the Board's intent, given that the funds in question do 
not meet the definition of a mutual fund in the ISB 2 If the Board disagrees with the 
staff, il should take this opportunity to consider what situations it intends to be covered 
by ISB 2 and ensure that the provisions of ISB 2 are clear regarding scope and 
applicability. If the Board agrees with the staff, then this issue may simply be the result 
of unclear wording in paragraph 1. If so, this could be alleviated by amending the 
definition of mutual funds, which we strongly encourage the Board to do, to ensure 
consistency in the application of the standard.
* * *
We appreciate the opportunity to express our views and would be pleased to discuss them 
with you in detail. If you have questions, please contact Robert H. Herz at (973) 236- 
7217 or Kenneth E. Dakdduk at (201) 521-3048.
